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spot-the-bug/stream-ciphers/monocypher-3.1.1/tests/test.c

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2020-09-25 05:58:08 +00:00
// This file is dual-licensed. Choose whichever licence you want from
// the two licences listed below.
//
// The first licence is a regular 2-clause BSD licence. The second licence
// is the CC-0 from Creative Commons. It is intended to release Monocypher
// to the public domain. The BSD licence serves as a fallback option.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause OR CC0-1.0
//
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, Loup Vaillant and Richard Walmsley
// All rights reserved.
//
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
// met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
// documentation and/or other materials provided with the
// distribution.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
// HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Written in 2017-2020 by Loup Vaillant and Richard Walmsley
//
// To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
// and related neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
// worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
//
// You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
// with this software. If not, see
// <https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "monocypher.h"
#include "monocypher-ed25519.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "vectors.h"
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE 128
#define SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE 128
////////////////////////////
/// Tests aginst vectors ///
////////////////////////////
static void chacha20(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *nonce = in + 1;
const vector *plain = in + 2;
u64 ctr = load64_le(in[3].buf);
u64 new_ctr = crypto_chacha20_ctr(out->buf, plain->buf, plain->size,
key->buf, nonce->buf, ctr);
u64 nb_blocks = plain->size / 64 + (plain->size % 64 != 0);
if (new_ctr - ctr != nb_blocks) {
printf("FAILURE: Chacha20 returned counter not correct: ");
}
}
static void ietf_chacha20(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *nonce = in + 1;
const vector *plain = in + 2;
u32 ctr = load32_le(in[3].buf);
u32 new_ctr = crypto_ietf_chacha20_ctr(out->buf, plain->buf, plain->size,
key->buf, nonce->buf, ctr);
u32 nb_blocks = (u32)(plain->size / 64 + (plain->size % 64 != 0));
if (new_ctr - ctr != nb_blocks) {
printf("FAILURE: IETF Chacha20 returned counter not correct: ");
}
}
static void hchacha20(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *nonce = in + 1;
crypto_hchacha20(out->buf, key->buf, nonce->buf);
}
static void xchacha20(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *nonce = in + 1;
const vector *plain = in + 2;
u64 ctr = load64_le(in[3].buf);
u64 new_ctr = crypto_xchacha20_ctr(out->buf, plain->buf, plain->size,
key->buf, nonce->buf, ctr);
u64 nb_blocks = plain->size / 64 + (plain->size % 64 != 0);
if (new_ctr - ctr != nb_blocks) {
printf("FAILURE: XChacha20 returned counter not correct: ");
}
}
static void poly1305(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *msg = in + 1;
crypto_poly1305(out->buf, msg->buf, msg->size, key->buf);
}
static void aead_ietf(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *nonce = in + 1;
const vector *ad = in + 2;
const vector *text = in + 3;
crypto_lock_aead(out ->buf, out->buf + 16, key->buf, nonce->buf,
ad->buf, ad->size, text->buf, text->size);
}
static void blake2b(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *msg = in;
const vector *key = in + 1;
crypto_blake2b_general(out->buf, out->size,
key->buf, key->size,
msg->buf, msg->size);
}
static void sha512(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
crypto_sha512(out->buf, in->buf, in->size);
}
static void hmac_sha512(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *key = in;
const vector *msg = in +1;
crypto_hmac_sha512(out->buf, key->buf, key->size, msg->buf, msg->size);
}
static void argon2i(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
u64 nb_blocks = load64_le(in[0].buf);
u64 nb_iterations = load64_le(in[1].buf);
const vector *password = in + 2;
const vector *salt = in + 3;
const vector *key = in + 4;
const vector *ad = in + 5;
void *work_area = alloc(nb_blocks * 1024);
crypto_argon2i_general(out->buf, (u32)out->size,
work_area, (u32)nb_blocks, (u32)nb_iterations,
password->buf, (u32)password->size,
salt ->buf, (u32)salt ->size,
key ->buf, (u32)key ->size,
ad ->buf, (u32)ad ->size);
free(work_area);
}
static void x25519(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *scalar = in;
const vector *point = in + 1;
crypto_x25519(out->buf, scalar->buf, point->buf);
}
static void x25519_pk(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
crypto_x25519_public_key(out->buf, in->buf);
}
static void key_exchange(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *secret_key = in;
const vector *public_key = in + 1;
crypto_key_exchange(out->buf, secret_key->buf, public_key->buf);
}
static void edDSA(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *secret_k = in;
const vector *public_k = in + 1;
const vector *msg = in + 2;
u8 out2[64];
// Sign with cached public key, then by reconstructing the key
crypto_sign(out->buf, secret_k->buf, public_k->buf, msg->buf, msg->size);
crypto_sign(out2 , secret_k->buf, 0 , msg->buf, msg->size);
// Compare signatures (must be the same)
if (memcmp(out->buf, out2, out->size)) {
printf("FAILURE: reconstructing public key"
" yields different signature\n");
}
}
static void edDSA_pk(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
crypto_sign_public_key(out->buf, in->buf);
}
static void ed_25519(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *secret_k = in;
const vector *public_k = in + 1;
const vector *msg = in + 2;
u8 out2[64];
// Sign with cached public key, then by reconstructing the key
crypto_ed25519_sign(out->buf, secret_k->buf, public_k->buf,
msg->buf, msg->size);
crypto_ed25519_sign(out2 , secret_k->buf, 0,
msg->buf, msg->size);
// Compare signatures (must be the same)
if (memcmp(out->buf, out2, out->size)) {
printf("FAILURE: reconstructing public key"
" yields different signature\n");
}
}
static void ed_25519_pk(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
crypto_ed25519_public_key(out->buf, in->buf);
}
static void ed_25519_check(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *public_k = in;
const vector *msg = in + 1;
const vector *sig = in + 2;
out->buf[0] = (u8)crypto_ed25519_check(sig->buf, public_k->buf,
msg->buf, msg->size);
}
static void iterate_x25519(u8 k[32], u8 u[32])
{
u8 tmp[32];
crypto_x25519(tmp , k, u);
memcpy(u, k , 32);
memcpy(k, tmp, 32);
}
static int test_x25519()
{
u8 _1 [32] = {0x42, 0x2c, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0x62, 0x27, 0xd7, 0xbc,
0xa1, 0x35, 0x0b, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x9f,
0x78, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x7b, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x4b, 0x78,
0x3c, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x03, 0x11, 0xae, 0x30, 0x79};
u8 k[32] = {9};
u8 u[32] = {9};
crypto_x25519_public_key(k, u);
int status = memcmp(k, _1, 32);
printf("%s: x25519 1\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
u8 _1k [32] = {0x68, 0x4c, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x09, 0x55,
0x28, 0x00, 0xef, 0x56, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x3c,
0x1c, 0x38, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x93, 0x60, 0xe3, 0x87,
0x5f, 0x2e, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x51};
FOR (i, 1, 1000) { iterate_x25519(k, u); }
status |= memcmp(k, _1k, 32);
printf("%s: x25519 1K\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
// too long; didn't run
//u8 _1M[32] = {0x7c, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe0, 0xab, 0x25, 0x86, 0xfd,
// 0x86, 0x44, 0x97, 0x29, 0x7e, 0x57, 0x5e, 0x6f,
// 0x3b, 0xc6, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x3c, 0x30, 0xdf,
// 0x5f, 0x4d, 0xd2, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0x66, 0x54, 0x24};
//FOR (i, 1000, 1000000) { iterate_x25519(k, u); }
//status |= memcmp(k, _1M, 32);
//printf("%s: x25519 1M\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static void elligator_dir(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
crypto_hidden_to_curve(out->buf, in->buf);
}
static void elligator_inv(const vector in[], vector *out)
{
const vector *point = in;
u8 tweak = in[1].buf[0];
u8 failure = in[2].buf[0];
int check = crypto_curve_to_hidden(out->buf, point->buf, tweak);
if ((u8)check != failure) {
fprintf(stderr, "Elligator inverse map: failure mismatch\n");
}
if (check) {
out->buf[0] = 0;
}
}
//////////////////////////////
/// Self consistency tests ///
//////////////////////////////
static int p_verify(size_t size, int (*compare)(const u8*, const u8*))
{
int status = 0;
u8 a[64]; // size <= 64
u8 b[64]; // size <= 64
FOR (i, 0, 2) {
FOR (j, 0, 2) {
// Set every byte to the chosen value, then compare
FOR (k, 0, size) {
a[k] = (u8)i;
b[k] = (u8)j;
}
int cmp = compare(a, b);
status |= (i == j ? cmp : ~cmp);
// Set only two bytes to the chosen value, then compare
FOR (k, 0, size / 2) {
FOR (l, 0, size) {
a[l] = 0;
b[l] = 0;
}
a[k] = (u8)i; a[k + size/2 - 1] = (u8)i;
b[k] = (u8)j; b[k + size/2 - 1] = (u8)j;
cmp = compare(a, b);
status |= (i == j ? cmp : ~cmp);
}
}
}
printf("%s: crypto_verify%zu\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK", size);
return status;
}
static int p_verify16(){ return p_verify(16, crypto_verify16); }
static int p_verify32(){ return p_verify(32, crypto_verify32); }
static int p_verify64(){ return p_verify(64, crypto_verify64); }
static int p_chacha20_ctr()
{
int status = 0;
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(nonce, 24);
RANDOM_INPUT(plain, 128);
u8 out_full[128];
u8 out1 [64];
u8 out2 [64];
crypto_chacha20 (out_full, plain , 128, key, nonce);
crypto_chacha20_ctr(out1 , plain + 0, 64, key, nonce, 0);
crypto_chacha20_ctr(out2 , plain + 64, 64, key, nonce, 1);
status |= memcmp(out_full , out1, 64);
status |= memcmp(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
crypto_ietf_chacha20 (out_full, plain , 128, key, nonce);
crypto_ietf_chacha20_ctr(out1 , plain + 0, 64, key, nonce, 0);
crypto_ietf_chacha20_ctr(out2 , plain + 64, 64, key, nonce, 1);
status |= memcmp(out_full , out1, 64);
status |= memcmp(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
crypto_xchacha20 (out_full, plain , 128, key, nonce);
crypto_xchacha20_ctr(out1 , plain + 0, 64, key, nonce, 0);
crypto_xchacha20_ctr(out2 , plain + 64, 64, key, nonce, 1);
status |= memcmp(out_full , out1, 64);
status |= memcmp(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
printf("%s: Chacha20 (ctr)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that Chacha20(nullptr) == Chacha20(all-zeroes)
static int p_chacha20_stream()
{
int status = 0;
#define INPUT_SIZE (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 + 1)
FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
u8 output_normal[INPUT_SIZE];
u8 output_stream[INPUT_SIZE];
u8 zeroes [INPUT_SIZE] = {0};
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(nonce, 8);
crypto_chacha20(output_normal, zeroes, i, key, nonce);
crypto_chacha20(output_stream, 0 , i, key, nonce);
status |= memcmp(output_normal, output_stream, i);
}
printf("%s: Chacha20 (nullptr == zeroes)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that output and input can be the same pointer
static int p_chacha20_same_ptr()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) // total input size
int status = 0;
u8 output[INPUT_SIZE];
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(nonce, 8);
crypto_chacha20(output, input, INPUT_SIZE, key, nonce);
crypto_chacha20(input , input, INPUT_SIZE, key, nonce);
status |= memcmp(output, input, INPUT_SIZE);
printf("%s: Chacha20 (output == input)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_hchacha20()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 100) {
RANDOM_INPUT(buffer, 80);
size_t out_idx = rand64() % 48;
size_t key_idx = rand64() % 48;
size_t in_idx = rand64() % 64;
u8 key[32]; FOR (j, 0, 32) { key[j] = buffer[j + key_idx]; }
u8 in [16]; FOR (j, 0, 16) { in [j] = buffer[j + in_idx]; }
// Run with and without overlap, then compare
u8 out[32];
crypto_hchacha20(out, key, in);
crypto_hchacha20(buffer + out_idx, buffer + key_idx, buffer + in_idx);
status |= memcmp(out, buffer + out_idx, 32);
}
printf("%s: HChacha20 (overlap)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that authenticating bit by bit yields the same mac than
// authenticating all at once
static int p_poly1305()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
// outputs
u8 mac_chunk[16];
u8 mac_whole[16];
// inputs
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
// Authenticate bit by bit
crypto_poly1305_ctx ctx;
crypto_poly1305_init(&ctx, key);
crypto_poly1305_update(&ctx, input , i);
crypto_poly1305_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
crypto_poly1305_final(&ctx, mac_chunk);
// Authenticate all at once
crypto_poly1305(mac_whole, input, INPUT_SIZE, key);
// Compare the results (must be the same)
status |= memcmp(mac_chunk, mac_whole, 16);
}
printf("%s: Poly1305 (incremental)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the input and output buffers of poly1305 can overlap.
static int p_poly1305_overlap()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 16)) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + 16) {
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
u8 mac [16];
crypto_poly1305(mac , input + 16, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, key);
crypto_poly1305(input+i, input + 16, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, key);
status |= memcmp(mac, input + i, 16);
}
printf("%s: Poly1305 (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that hashing bit by bit yields the same hash than hashing all
// at once. Note: I figured we didn't need to test keyed mode, or
// different hash sizes, again. This test sticks to the simplified
// interface.
static int p_blake2b()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 - 32) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
// outputs
u8 hash_chunk[64];
u8 hash_whole[64];
// inputs
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Authenticate bit by bit
crypto_blake2b_ctx ctx;
crypto_blake2b_init(&ctx);
crypto_blake2b_update(&ctx, input , i);
crypto_blake2b_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
crypto_blake2b_final(&ctx, hash_chunk);
// Authenticate all at once
crypto_blake2b(hash_whole, input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Compare the results (must be the same)
status |= memcmp(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
}
printf("%s: Blake2b (incremental)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the input and output buffers of Blake2b can overlap.
static int p_blake2b_overlap()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
u8 hash [64];
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
crypto_blake2b(hash , input + 64, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_blake2b(input+i, input + 64, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE);
status |= memcmp(hash, input + i, 64);
}
printf("%s: Blake2b (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that hashing bit by bit yields the same hash than hashing all
// at once. (for sha512)
static int p_sha512()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 - 32) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
// outputs
u8 hash_chunk[64];
u8 hash_whole[64];
// inputs
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Authenticate bit by bit
crypto_sha512_ctx ctx;
crypto_sha512_init(&ctx);
crypto_sha512_update(&ctx, input , i);
crypto_sha512_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
crypto_sha512_final(&ctx, hash_chunk);
// Authenticate all at once
crypto_sha512(hash_whole, input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Compare the results (must be the same)
status |= memcmp(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
}
printf("%s: Sha512 (incremental)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the input and output buffers of crypto_sha_512 can overlap.
static int p_sha512_overlap()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
u8 hash [64];
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
crypto_sha512(hash , input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_sha512(input+i, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
status |= memcmp(hash, input + i, 64);
}
printf("%s: Sha512 (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that hashing bit by bit yields the same hash than hashing all
// at once. (for hmac)
static int p_hmac_sha512()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 - 32) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
// outputs
u8 hash_chunk[64];
u8 hash_whole[64];
// inputs
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Authenticate bit by bit
crypto_hmac_sha512_ctx ctx;
crypto_hmac_sha512_init(&ctx, key, 32);
crypto_hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, input , i);
crypto_hmac_sha512_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
crypto_hmac_sha512_final(&ctx, hash_chunk);
// Authenticate all at once
crypto_hmac_sha512(hash_whole, key, 32, input, INPUT_SIZE);
// Compare the results (must be the same)
status |= memcmp(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
}
printf("%s: HMAC SHA-512 (incremental)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the input and output buffers of crypto_sha_512 can overlap.
static int p_hmac_sha512_overlap()
{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
u8 hash [64];
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
crypto_hmac_sha512(hash , key, 32, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_hmac_sha512(input+i, key, 32, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
status |= memcmp(hash, input + i, 64);
}
printf("%s: HMAC SHA-512 (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_argon2i_easy()
{
int status = 0;
void *work_area = alloc(8 * 1024);
RANDOM_INPUT(password , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(salt , 16);
u8 hash_general[32];
u8 hash_easy [32];
crypto_argon2i_general(hash_general, 32, work_area, 8, 1,
password, 32, salt, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0);
crypto_argon2i(hash_easy, 32, work_area, 8, 1, password, 32, salt, 16);
status |= memcmp(hash_general, hash_easy, 32);
free(work_area);
printf("%s: Argon2i (easy interface)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_argon2i_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
u8 *work_area = (u8*)alloc(8 * 1024);
u8 *clean_work_area = (u8*)alloc(8 * 1024);
FOR (i, 0, 10) {
p_random(work_area, 8 * 1024);
u32 pass_offset = rand64() % 64;
u32 salt_offset = rand64() % 64;
u32 key_offset = rand64() % 64;
u32 ad_offset = rand64() % 64;
u8 hash1[32];
u8 hash2[32];
u8 pass [16]; FOR (j, 0, 16) { pass[j] = work_area[j + pass_offset]; }
u8 salt [16]; FOR (j, 0, 16) { salt[j] = work_area[j + salt_offset]; }
u8 key [32]; FOR (j, 0, 32) { key [j] = work_area[j + key_offset]; }
u8 ad [32]; FOR (j, 0, 32) { ad [j] = work_area[j + ad_offset]; }
crypto_argon2i_general(hash1, 32, clean_work_area, 8, 1,
pass, 16, salt, 16, key, 32, ad, 32);
crypto_argon2i_general(hash2, 32, work_area, 8, 1,
work_area + pass_offset, 16,
work_area + salt_offset, 16,
work_area + key_offset, 32,
work_area + ad_offset, 32);
status |= memcmp(hash1, hash2, 32);
}
free(work_area);
free(clean_work_area);
printf("%s: Argon2i (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the shared key and secret key buffers of crypto_x25519 can
// overlap.
static int p_x25519_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 62) {
u8 overlapping[94];
u8 separate[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
memcpy(overlapping + 31, sk, 32);
crypto_x25519(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31, pk);
crypto_x25519(separate, sk, pk);
status |= memcmp(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
}
printf("%s: x25519 (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the shared key and secret key buffers of
// crypto_key_exchange can overlap.
static int p_key_exchange_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 62) {
u8 overlapping[94];
u8 separate[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
memcpy(overlapping + 31, sk, 32);
crypto_key_exchange(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31, pk);
crypto_key_exchange(separate, sk, pk);
status |= memcmp(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
}
printf("%s: key_exchange (overlapping i/o)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_eddsa_roundtrip()
{
#define MESSAGE_SIZE 30
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE) {
RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
u8 pk [32]; crypto_sign_public_key(pk, sk);
u8 signature[64]; crypto_sign(signature, sk, pk, message, i);
status |= crypto_check(signature, pk, message, i);
// reject forgeries
u8 zero [64] = {0};
u8 forgery[64]; FOR (j, 0, 64) { forgery[j] = signature[j] + 1; }
status |= !crypto_check(zero , pk, message, i);
status |= !crypto_check(forgery, pk, message, i);
}
printf("%s: EdDSA (roundtrip)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Verifies that random signatures are all invalid. Uses random
// public keys to see what happens outside of the curve (it should
// yield an invalid signature).
static int p_eddsa_random()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 100) {
RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(signature , 64);
status |= ~crypto_check(signature, pk, message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
}
// Testing S == L (for code coverage)
RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
static const u8 signature[64] =
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10};
status |= ~crypto_check(signature, pk, message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
printf("%s: EdDSA (random)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Tests that the input and output buffers of crypto_sign() can overlap.
static int p_eddsa_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR(i, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE + 64) {
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (MESSAGE_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(sk , 32 );
u8 pk [32]; crypto_sign_public_key(pk, sk);
u8 signature[64];
crypto_sign(signature, sk, pk, input + 64, MESSAGE_SIZE);
crypto_sign(input+i , sk, pk, input + 64, MESSAGE_SIZE);
status |= memcmp(signature, input + i, 64);
}
printf("%s: EdDSA (overlap)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_eddsa_incremental()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE) {
RANDOM_INPUT(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE);
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
u8 pk [32]; crypto_sign_public_key(pk, sk);
u8 sig_mono[64]; crypto_sign(sig_mono, sk, pk, msg, MESSAGE_SIZE);
u8 sig_incr[64];
{
crypto_sign_ctx ctx;
crypto_sign_ctx_abstract *actx = (crypto_sign_ctx_abstract*)&ctx;
crypto_sign_init_first_pass (actx, sk, pk);
crypto_sign_update (actx, msg , i);
crypto_sign_update (actx, msg+i, MESSAGE_SIZE-i);
crypto_sign_init_second_pass(actx);
crypto_sign_update (actx, msg , i);
crypto_sign_update (actx, msg+i, MESSAGE_SIZE-i);
crypto_sign_final (actx, sig_incr);
}
status |= memcmp(sig_mono, sig_incr, 64);
status |= crypto_check(sig_mono, pk, msg, MESSAGE_SIZE);
{
crypto_check_ctx ctx;
crypto_check_ctx_abstract *actx = (crypto_check_ctx_abstract*)&ctx;
crypto_check_init (actx, sig_incr, pk);
crypto_check_update(actx, msg , i);
crypto_check_update(actx, msg+i, MESSAGE_SIZE-i);
status |= crypto_check_final(actx);
}
}
printf("%s: EdDSA (incremental)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_aead()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 1000) {
RANDOM_INPUT(key , 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(nonce , 24);
RANDOM_INPUT(ad , 4);
RANDOM_INPUT(plaintext, 8);
u8 box[24], box2[24];
u8 out[8];
// AEAD roundtrip
crypto_lock_aead(box, box+16, key, nonce, ad, 4, plaintext, 8);
status |= crypto_unlock_aead(out, key, nonce, box, ad, 4, box+16, 8);
status |= memcmp(plaintext, out, 8);
box[0]++;
status |= !crypto_unlock_aead(out, key, nonce, box, ad, 4, box+16, 8);
// Authenticated roundtrip (easy interface)
// Make and accept message
crypto_lock(box, box + 16, key, nonce, plaintext, 8);
status |= crypto_unlock(out, key, nonce, box, box + 16, 8);
// Make sure decrypted text and original text are the same
status |= memcmp(plaintext, out, 8);
// Make and reject forgery
box[0]++;
status |= !crypto_unlock(out, key, nonce, box, box + 16, 8);
box[0]--; // undo forgery
// Same result for both interfaces
crypto_lock_aead(box2, box2 + 16, key, nonce, 0, 0, plaintext, 8);
status |= memcmp(box, box2, 24);
}
printf("%s: aead (roundtrip)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
// Elligator direct mapping must ignore the most significant bits
static int p_elligator_direct_msb()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 20) {
RANDOM_INPUT(r, 32);
u8 r1[32]; memcpy(r1, r, 32); r1[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x00;
u8 r2[32]; memcpy(r2, r, 32); r2[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x40;
u8 r3[32]; memcpy(r3, r, 32); r3[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
u8 r4[32]; memcpy(r4, r, 32); r4[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0xc0;
u8 u [32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(u , r );
u8 u1[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(u1, r1);
u8 u2[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(u2, r2);
u8 u3[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(u3, r3);
u8 u4[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(u4, r4);
status |= memcmp(u, u1, 32);
status |= memcmp(u, u2, 32);
status |= memcmp(u, u3, 32);
status |= memcmp(u, u4, 32);
}
printf("%s: elligator direct (msb)\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_elligator_direct_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 62) {
u8 overlapping[94];
u8 separate[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(r, 32);
memcpy(overlapping + 31, r, 32);
crypto_hidden_to_curve(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31);
crypto_hidden_to_curve(separate, r);
status |= memcmp(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
}
printf("%s: elligator direct (overlapping i/o)\n",
status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_elligator_inverse_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 62) {
u8 overlapping[94];
u8 separate[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 33);
u8 tweak = pk[32];
memcpy(overlapping + 31, pk, 32);
int a = crypto_curve_to_hidden(overlapping+i, overlapping+31, tweak);
int b = crypto_curve_to_hidden(separate, pk, tweak);
status |= a - b;
if (a == 0) {
// The buffers are the same only if written to to begin with
status |= memcmp(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
}
}
printf("%s: elligator inverse (overlapping i/o)\n",
status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_elligator_x25519()
{
int status = 0;
int i = 0;
while (i < 64) {
RANDOM_INPUT(sk1, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(sk2, 32);
u8 skc [32]; memcpy(skc, sk1, 32); skc[0] &= 248;
u8 pks [32]; crypto_x25519_dirty_small(pks , sk1);
u8 pksc[32]; crypto_x25519_dirty_small(pksc, skc);
u8 pkf [32]; crypto_x25519_dirty_fast (pkf , sk1);
u8 pkfc[32]; crypto_x25519_dirty_fast (pkfc, skc);
u8 pk1 [32]; crypto_x25519_public_key (pk1 , sk1);
// Both dirty functions behave the same
status |= memcmp(pks, pkf, 32);
// Dirty functions behave cleanly if we clear the 3 msb first
status |= memcmp(pksc, pk1, 32);
status |= memcmp(pkfc, pk1, 32);
// Dirty functions behave the same as the clean one if the lsb
// are 0, differently if it is not
if ((sk1[0] & 7) == 0) { status |= memcmp(pk1, pkf, 32); }
else { status |= memcmp(pk1, pkf, 32) == 0; }
// Maximise tweak diversity.
// We want to set the bits 1 (sign) and 6-7 (padding)
u8 tweak = (u8)((i & 1) + (i << 6));
u8 r[32];
if (crypto_curve_to_hidden(r, pkf, tweak)) {
continue; // retry untill success (doesn't increment the tweak)
}
// Verify that the tweak's msb are copied to the representative
status |= (tweak >> 6) ^ (r[31] >> 6);
// Round trip
u8 pkr[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(pkr, r);
status |= memcmp(pkr, pkf, 32);
// Dirty and safe keys are compatible
u8 e1 [32]; crypto_x25519(e1, sk2, pk1);
u8 e2 [32]; crypto_x25519(e2, sk2, pkr);
status |= memcmp(e1, e2, 32);
i++;
}
printf("%s: elligator x25519\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_elligator_key_pair()
{
int status = 0;
FOR(i, 0, 32) {
RANDOM_INPUT(seed, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(sk2 , 32);
u8 r [32];
u8 sk1[32]; crypto_hidden_key_pair(r, sk1, seed);
u8 pkr[32]; crypto_hidden_to_curve(pkr, r);
u8 pk1[32]; crypto_x25519_public_key(pk1, sk1);
u8 e1 [32]; crypto_x25519(e1, sk2, pk1);
u8 e2 [32]; crypto_x25519(e2, sk2, pkr);
status |= memcmp(e1, e2, 32);
}
printf("%s: elligator key pair\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_elligator_key_pair_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 94) {
u8 over[158];
u8 sep [ 64];
RANDOM_INPUT(s1, 32);
u8 *s2 = over + 63;
memcpy(s2, s1, 32);
crypto_hidden_key_pair(sep , sep + 32, s1);
crypto_hidden_key_pair(over + i, over + i + 32, s2);
status |= memcmp(sep, over + i, 64);
}
printf("%s: elligator key pair (overlapping i/o)\n",
status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_x25519_inverse()
{
int status = 0;
const u8 base [32] = {9};
// check round trip
FOR (i, 0, 50) {
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
u8 pk [32];
u8 blind[32];
crypto_x25519_public_key(pk, sk);
crypto_x25519_inverse(blind, sk, pk);
status |= memcmp(blind, base, 32);
}
// check cofactor clearing
// (Multiplying by a low order point yields zero
u8 low_order[4][32] = {
{0}, {1},
{0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24,
0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b,
0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86,
0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57,},
{0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae,
0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a,
0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd,
0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00,},
};
u8 zero[32] = {0};
FOR (i, 0, 32) {
u8 blind[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
crypto_x25519_inverse(blind, sk, low_order[i%4]);
status |= memcmp(blind, zero, 32);
}
printf("%s: x25519_inverse\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_x25519_inverse_overlap()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 62) {
u8 overlapping[94];
u8 separate[32];
RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
memcpy(overlapping + 31, sk, 32);
crypto_x25519_inverse(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31, pk);
crypto_x25519_inverse(separate, sk, pk);
status |= memcmp(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
}
printf("%s: x25519 inverse (overlapping i/o)\n",
status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_from_eddsa()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 32) {
RANDOM_INPUT(ed_private, 32);
u8 ed_public[32]; crypto_sign_public_key (ed_public, ed_private);
u8 x_private[32]; crypto_from_eddsa_private(x_private, ed_private);
u8 x_public1[32]; crypto_from_eddsa_public (x_public1, ed_public);
u8 x_public2[32]; crypto_x25519_public_key (x_public2, x_private);
status |= memcmp(x_public1, x_public2, 32);
}
printf("%s: from_eddsa\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
static int p_from_ed25519()
{
int status = 0;
FOR (i, 0, 32) {
RANDOM_INPUT(ed_private, 32);
u8 ed_public[32]; crypto_ed25519_public_key (ed_public, ed_private);
u8 x_private[32]; crypto_from_ed25519_private(x_private, ed_private);
u8 x_public1[32]; crypto_from_ed25519_public (x_public1, ed_public);
u8 x_public2[32]; crypto_x25519_public_key (x_public2, x_private);
status |= memcmp(x_public1, x_public2, 32);
}
printf("%s: from_ed25519\n", status != 0 ? "FAILED" : "OK");
return status;
}
#define TEST(name, nb_inputs) vector_test(name, #name, nb_inputs, \
nb_##name##_vectors, \
name##_vectors, \
name##_sizes)
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc > 1) {
sscanf(argv[1], "%" PRIu64 "", &random_state);
}
printf("\nRandom seed: %" PRIu64 "\n", random_state);
int status = 0;
printf("\nTest against vectors");
printf("\n--------------------\n");
status |= TEST(chacha20 , 4);
status |= TEST(ietf_chacha20 , 4);
status |= TEST(hchacha20 , 2);
status |= TEST(xchacha20 , 4);
status |= TEST(poly1305 , 2);
status |= TEST(aead_ietf , 4);
status |= TEST(blake2b , 2);
status |= TEST(sha512 , 1);
status |= TEST(hmac_sha512 , 2);
status |= TEST(argon2i , 6);
status |= TEST(x25519 , 2);
status |= TEST(x25519_pk , 1);
status |= TEST(key_exchange , 2);
status |= TEST(edDSA , 3);
status |= TEST(edDSA_pk , 1);
status |= TEST(ed_25519 , 3);
status |= TEST(ed_25519_pk , 1);
status |= TEST(ed_25519_check, 3);
status |= test_x25519();
status |= TEST(elligator_dir , 1);
status |= TEST(elligator_inv , 3);
printf("\nProperty based tests");
printf("\n--------------------\n");
status |= p_verify16();
status |= p_verify32();
status |= p_verify64();
status |= p_chacha20_ctr();
status |= p_chacha20_stream();
status |= p_chacha20_same_ptr();
status |= p_hchacha20();
status |= p_poly1305();
status |= p_poly1305_overlap();
status |= p_blake2b();
status |= p_blake2b_overlap();
status |= p_sha512();
status |= p_sha512_overlap();
status |= p_hmac_sha512();
status |= p_hmac_sha512_overlap();
status |= p_argon2i_easy();
status |= p_argon2i_overlap();
status |= p_x25519_overlap();
status |= p_key_exchange_overlap();
status |= p_eddsa_roundtrip();
status |= p_eddsa_random();
status |= p_eddsa_overlap();
status |= p_eddsa_incremental();
status |= p_aead();
status |= p_elligator_direct_msb();
status |= p_elligator_direct_overlap();
status |= p_elligator_inverse_overlap();
status |= p_elligator_x25519();
status |= p_elligator_key_pair();
status |= p_elligator_key_pair_overlap();
status |= p_x25519_inverse();
status |= p_x25519_inverse_overlap();
status |= p_from_eddsa();
status |= p_from_ed25519();
printf("\n%s\n\n", status != 0 ? "SOME TESTS FAILED" : "All tests OK!");
return status;
}